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BUILDING VICTIM-LED COALITIONS IN THE PURSUIT OF
ACCOUNTABILITY
This panel was convened at 9:00 a.m., Thursday, April 5, 2018, by its moderator Reed Brody of
Human Rights Watch, who introduced the panelists: Marino Cordoba, Victim Advocate;
Souleymane Guengueng, a victim and activist; Diane Orentlicher of American University
Washington College of Law; and Kathy Roberts of the Transitional Justice Clinic.

BUILDING VICTIM-LED COALITIONS TO PRESS FOR JUSTICE FOLLOWING
MASS ATROCITY
By Diane Orentlicher*

Assurances of victim participation in proceedings before the International Criminal Court and
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia have been seen as a welcome corrective to
the flawed model of earlier tribunals.1 The first such tribunal created since the postwar period,
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), was established by the
UN Security Council in May 19932 without even consulting those who survived the atrocities
that gave rise to its creation, the majority of which took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 3 Nor
were victims formally incorporated into the ICTY's work except for those who provided testimony
and other evidence. (The same holds true for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
established by the UN Security Council in 1994;4 in the interests of brevity, my remarks will
focus on the ICTY.)
In striking contrast, victims were central to two landmark trials in the past five years-the
prosecution in 2015-2016 of former Chadian dictator Hissine Habr6 before the Extraordinary
African Chambers in Senegal,5 which is the focus of other panelists' remarks, and the 2013 trial
of former dictator Efrain Rios Montt in Guatemala. 6 While several factors account for these
historic trials, robust and sustained campaigns by victims provided crucial impetus for both. In
myriad ways, moreover, Chadian and Guatemalan victims' persistent engagement may have
enhanced their satisfaction with justice long delayed.
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At a time of diminishing great-power support for retrospective justice, it is well worth our while
to mine these experiences as models that might be adapted to other contexts in which victims
demand justice yet face numerous obstacles. While other panelists will take up this task, my primary goal here is to offer a corrective to a widespread perception perhaps implied in my earlier
remarks: that victims of atrocities prosecuted before the ICTY were marginal to its work except
for their crucial contributions as witnesses. This perception pervades the English-language literature on the ICTY, which typically explains the Tribunal's creation in terms of the actions and motivations of relevant states and intergovernmental bodies. 7
To be sure, as a creature of the UN Security Council, the ICTY exemplifies top-down, externally
imposed justice. Yet standard accounts of the Tribunal, which relegate victims to the role of
bystanders to its creation and render them peripheral to its operation except as witnesses, erase
their contributions and agency. In fact, well before the ICTY was created, Bosnian rape survivors
were actively engaged in documenting mass rapes with a view to prosecutions, and became active
participants in global efforts to ensure justice for crimes of sexual violence once the Tribunal was
launched. Survivors and other activists also shared valuable evidence with the ICTY prosecutor,
and pressed governments to cooperate with the Tribunal. Advocates in former Yugoslav states
have, moreover, long pressed their governments to build on the ICTY's findings by undertaking
meaningful gestures of acknowledgment and penance.
English-language literature on the ICTY has also largely obscured the central role of domestic
lawyers in developing national war crimes institutions in Bosnia, which are among the ICTY's
most tangible (albeit imperiled) legacies. Understandably, accounts of Bosnia's war crimes chamber (WCC) and Special Department for War Crimes in the Office of the Prosecutor, which began
operating in 2005, typically emphasize the roles of the ICTY and the Office of the High
Representative (OHR) for Bosnia in developing these institutions.9 While the ICTY and OHR
indeed played key roles, Bosnian legal professionals were deeply involved in developing these
institutions. 10
Acknowledging their role is not just a matter of getting the facts right. Obscuring the contributions of domestic lawyers has compounded already formidable challenges to Bosnia's fragile war
crimes institutions. Judge Patricia Whalen, who served as an international judge on the WCC,
recalls: "All you ever heard about was the OHR, the ICTY, the OHR, the ICTY."II In her view,
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the misleading perception that the WCC was essentially a foreign institution "became a weapon
that was used against" it by nationalists opposed to the chamber's work.12
Most accounts of the ICTY also obscure the degree to which the Hague Tribunal's work helped
mobilize civil society advocates in Bosnia, Serbia, and other former Yugoslav states, some of
whom have partnered with Tribunal officials in programs aimed at advancing domestic processes
of reckoning with wartime atrocities.1 3 This type of influence can, at least in some circumstances,
have powerful reverberations: by mobilizing domestic advocates, international criminal courts can
indirectly help advance accountability for past atrocities in national forums.14 To the extent this
leads to human rights prosecutions in domestic courts, we may see a valuable downstream impact:
a growing body of research has found a "strong and statistically significant" correlation between
such prosecutions and decreased levels of repression.15
So far I have sought to correct a pervasive belief that the ICTY, as well as domestic war crimes
institutions it helped launch, are solely the work of international actors. Yet this is not to suggest
that the role of victims and other local actors in shaping the ICTY's legacy is comparable to that of
victim-led coalitions that relentlessly and successfully campaigned to bring Hissine Habr6 and
Efrain Rios Montt before the bar of justice. An intriguing question is whether differing degrees
of victim engagement in bringingabout trials before the ICTY on the one hand, and prosecutions
before the Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal and the Guatemalan court that tried Rios
Montt on the other hand, influenced victims' experience of justice before these courts.
Any answer must be tentative and qualified, not least because victims' perceptions of justice
result from the complex interaction of many factors. With appropriate caveats, then, I suspect
that many Chadian and Guatemalan victims experienced long-delayed justice with special satisfaction in part because they had overcome seemingly insurmountable odds to bring Habr6 and Rios
Montt, respectively, to justice; in contrast, by the time many of the ICTY's high-level defendants
were brought to trial, many Bosnians had grown weary of waiting for the kind of justice they
thought the international community had promised to deliver decades earlier, when the ICTY
was established. As I note in Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY's Impact in Bosnia and Serbia,
Bosnian survivors "did not experience long-awaited trials [of major suspects] the same way
they would have years earlier. " Even so, when the ICTY rendered its final trial verdict in late
17
November 2017, convicting Ratko Mladid of genocide and sentencing him to life in prison,
many Bosnians savored the long-awaited judgment.

CONCLUSION

The image of top-down justice widely associated with the ICTY has obscured the active engagement of victims and other civil society actors in demanding justice and shaping the Tribunal's
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not last as long as major leadership trials in the ICTY. This, too, may go some way toward accounting for survivors' apparently high levels of satisfaction with the outcome of these trials.
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achievements. In some respects, our failure to recognize their contributions has undermined civil
society actors working under perilous conditions.
Going forward, at a time of diminishing global support for international criminal tribunals, the
role of civil society actors in ensuring justice for grievous harms is likely to become more important
than ever. If they succeed, their efforts may bring uniquely gratifying results.

